Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Introduction
Pluralism is a basic general rule of media policy. In media markets, authorities are even more concerned with market concentration than in other markets because, besides protecting economic competition, they additionally wish to safeguard pluralism. Polo (2007) defines pluralism as the "objective of ensuring a balanced, fair and unbiased access of all the political opinions and views to the media." Diversity of opinion is seen as a major public objective for the media sector, relating to political aims like deliberation, participation, and democracy, as well as to social aims like social cohesion and cultural diversity (see, e.g., the early works of Hayek (1945); Downs (1957) , or more recent works of Armstrong (2005) ; von Hagen and Seabright Allgemeine Zeitung. In the same year, Ofcom approved a joint venture in the UK regional newspaper market involving DMGT, Yattendon Group, and Trinity Mirror.
This consolidation trend is spurring a debate on the consequences for pluralism in the markets, raising concerns for media policy that strive towards safeguarding pluralism in the markets. Media pluralism is usually seen as threatened by concentration trends in the media markets. The concern that higher levels of market concentration reduce pluralism, however, implicity assumes that a single outlet only o↵ers a single view, e.g., on politics, so that the diversity of views necessarily decreases with a declining number of outlets. What is often not considered is that pluralism may also be realized within media outlets, each providing a variety of views. This notion of pluralism is defined as "internal pluralism". Thus, when making presumptions about the e↵ect of reduced economic competition on pluralism, one should adopt two views, firstly, pluralism within an outlet, internal pluralism, and secondly, pluralism o↵ered by the broader market, defined as "external pluralism".
Our paper focuses on both definitions of pluralism. In particular, we analyze whether an increase in concentration, i.e., a reduction in the number of media outlets in the market, necessarily reduces pluralism. The underlying question from an industrial organization perspective is whether a single media outlet will also find it profitable to o↵er a variety of views. If the answer is in the a rmative, the e↵ect of reduced economic competition on external pluralism is not clear. This is the starting point of the present paper. We set up a two-sided market model and consider comparative static e↵ects of the number of firms on a Salop circle on both internal and on external pluralism.
We also distinguish between advertising-financed media and pay media, of which the latter is becoming more and more common.
An increasing amount of work has been focussing on the e↵ect of concentration on external pluralism. The underlying question from an industrial organization perspective is whether the market really o↵ers a variety of views. Early normative works on media economics starting with Steiner (1952), Spence and Owen (1977) , and Wildman and Owen (1985) conclude that external pluralism is low in a free market. 2 Advertising-funded broad-2 Sieg and Stühmeier (2015) survey the literature on several market imperfections in casters seek to maximize their viewership by broadcasting the same kind of programs that appeal to the broadest possible audience. These early works, however, do not consider the two-sided market nature of broadcasting markets; advertising levels and prices are assumed fixed. Modern work paints a more diverse picture of competition on external pluralism. Gabszewicz et al. (2004) show that when there are negative advertising externalities, broadcasters are likely to di↵erentiate their programs under competition. In a model of newspaper competition, Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) show that newspapers segment the market when readers' political beliefs di↵er.
Readers with access to all news sources can obtain an unbiased perspective, and reader heterogeneity is more important for media accuracy than competition per se. In their model of broadcasting competition, Anderson and Coate (2005) obtain comparable results, namely that markets can provide too few or too many programs. Under-provision can occur when the benefits of programming to viewers are high, relative to the benefits for advertisers.
Over-provision can arise when program benefits are low, relative to advertiser benefits and the nuisance costs of advertising are low. Common to all these works is the assumption that a single outlet only o↵ers one type of content, so they do not focus on internal pluralism.
Few works focus on the e↵ect of competition on those view of pluralism, so that our paper aims to fill this gap. Our approch is in line with Garcia Pires (2014), whose approach allows outlets to adopt a multi-ideology strategy, in the manner of Alexandrov (2008) . We use the same technology as Alexandrov (2008) and allow outlets to be located not only on single points on the spectrum of views, but also over an interval. In particular, we use a Salopmodel of a circular city to test the relation between economic competition, measured by the number of firms on the circle, and pluralism, measured by the variety of content o↵ered. We show that higher levels of market concentration lead a single outlet to o↵er a higher level of internal pluralism.
However, in total, the market level of pluralism (external pluralism) is lower, the lower the level of economic competition. Moreover, we show that there is no clear-cut result as to whether pluralism is lower under advertising media than under pay media. This depends crucially on the revenue function for advertising. Finally, we compare our results to a setup in which all outlets media markets.
are owned by a monopolist. It turns out that pluralism is not necessarily lower subject to ownership concentration than under competition.
There is some empirical evidence on the relation between media market concentration and internal pluralism. Berry and Waldfogel (2001) examine the e↵ects of ownership concentration on programming variety in radio broadcasting. They find that consolidation reduces entry, but increases the number of radio formats broadcast, both absolutely and relative to the number of stations in a market. George (2007) demonstrates that increases in ownership concentration in the US newspaper market lead firms to di↵er-entiate products to a greater extent and cover a larger number of reporting topics. There is more empirical work on the relation between media market concentration and external pluralism. Empirical evidence on how mergers a↵ect diversity is mixed, mergers may even increase diversity in the market (see, e.g., Berry and Waldfogel (2001) ; Sweeting (2010); Gentzkow et al. 
The basic model
We are interested in modelling the relation between media market concentration and pluralism both provided by a single outlet (a newspaper, a website, a broadcaster, ...) and by the market. We use a two-sided market model (see, e.g., Anderson and Coate (2005) ; Armstrong (2006); Choi (2006) ) to analyze such relation. Assume there are n 2 media outlets in the market, equidistantly located on a Salop circle 3 with a perimeter of one, and located clockwise from outlet 1 to outlet n. The perimeter of the circle is interpreted as the spectrum of available views, e.g., ideological views on politics or on 3 See Salop (1979) . the economy. Typically, it is assumed that media outlets only o↵er a single type view and that the variety of views in the market may therefore only be increased by market entry. What is often not considered is that a single outlet can also contribute to variety by itself o↵ering more than one view.
Following Polo (2007) , we refer to the former aspect as "external pluralism (EP)" and to the latter aspect as "internal pluralism (IP)." In line with Alexandrov (2008) and Garcia Pires (2014) 4 , we therefore assume that outlets can adopt a multi-characteristic strategy, so that an outlet at position 0 may o↵er an interval of content from [ l i , l i ]. Due to outlet symmetry, we can directly assume that l i = l i , i.e., outlets o↵er internal pluralism of Consumers (readers, users, viewers, ...) with unitary density are uniformly distributed on the circle. We assume full market coverage and that each consumer consumes one type of content only (i.e., we assume that consumers "singlehome") 5 . Consumers within the range of views o↵ered by the outlets can consume their preferred content, and utility is denoted as
They receive a gross utility from consuming their ideal variety of V , but face a disutility from consuming an amount of advertising a i , where a i denotes the nuisance cost of advertising. Additionally, they may have to pay a per-unit price p i . Consumers outside the interval incur additional disutility from not consuming their ideal content (tx as "transportation cost"), so their utility is denoted as
A consumer located at position x is then indi↵erent between consuming from
Each outlet receives a market share of s i with
for i 1 and i + 1, the neighbors of outlet i are to the left and to the right.
Advertising-financed media
We first focus on advertising-financed media and set p i = 0. Although the exclusion of viewers through payments is generally possible, for many providers it is still common to provide content for free, as long as a su cient scale of the advertising-funded model is reached. We consider advertising that informs consumers about new products that they would buy if they were aware of them (see Grossman and Shapiro, 1984) , but which causes a utility loss for viewers (see also Anderson and Coate, 2005; Choi, 2006) . 
The first term gives the revenue from advertising and the second term reflects the cost associated with o↵ering internal pluralism. We assume that it becomes increasingly more costly for outlets to provide more variety, for example, because they need to hire new journalists for every additional type of content. The parameter is a scale parameter of the cost. 7
The outlets decide simultaneously about advertising (a i ) and variety (l i ) by maximizing equation (5) and the first-order conditions are
6 Since viewers singlehome, outlets have monopoly power over access to their viewers. 7 Technically, the total cost of o↵ering internal pluralism of 2li is
From @s i @a i R(a i ) < 0 in equation (6), it follows that outlets set lower advertising levels which would maximize per viewer revenue R(a), i.e., it follows that @R(a) @a > 0 at optimal advertising levels of a ⇤ i . Solving equation (7) for the optimal level of variety, it follows that
We see that internal pluralism depends positively on advertising revenue. This is in contrast to the traditional wisdom (Steiner (1952) ; Spence and Owen (1977) ; Wildman and Owen (1985) ) that reliance on advertising income leads to a low content variety. Here, the opposite is true, because if advertising revenue per consumer is high, outlets have a stronger incentive to compete for consumers by o↵ering their preferred content. Technically, outlets balance the marginal benefit of providing more variety in terms of an increase per viewer profit (R(a)) against the cost of providing variety ( ).
Assumption 1. Assume that parameters are such that
We have to impose restrictions on the parameters so that the outlets' intervals do not overlap, i.e., l ⇤ i  1 2n . 8 From equation (6), using the market share expression of equation (4), the optimal advertising level in the symmetric equilibrium is implicitly given as
or using R(a) = p(a)a as
where ✏ = @p(a) @a
) denotes the elasticity of advertiser demand. Observe that because @R(a) @a > 0 at equilibrium, it necessarily follows that outlets set 8 If intervals overlap, each outlet can marginally decrease advertising and capture a positive amount of consumers. Standard Bertrand arguments apply, so that an outlet finds it more profitable to locate only on a point on the circle. As equation (8) shows, the restriction is fulfilled if o↵ering pluralism is su ciently costly, i.e., if is high.
advertising levels in the inelastic region of the advertiser demand curve, i.e., ✏ < 1 at a ⇤ i . We are now interested in the comparative static e↵ects of concentration, i.e., a decrease in the number of outlets n, on pluralism. 9 First, we analyze the e↵ect of concentration on advertising. Di↵erentiation of equation (10) with respect to n yields 10
From ✏ < 1 and from @✏ @a 0 it follows that @a ⇤ i @n < 0 and thus:
Lemma 1. The equilibrium advertising level is higher in more concentrated markets.
The higher the market concentration, the less intense the competition for viewers and thus, the higher the equilibrium advertising level.
Internal pluralism is then a↵ected by market concentration as
From @R(a) @a > 0 and from
Therefore, we can conclude: Proposition 1. Internal pluralism is higher in more concentrated markets.
Outlets respond to an increase in concentration by increasing their variety.
With fewer outlets active in the market, the distance between the indi↵erent consumer's taste and the outlets' positions increases and so do transportation costs. This puts pressure on the advertising level, reducing per viewer 9 We take a long-run perspective on the market outcomes after relocation to symmetric market structures. We do not analyze the short-run strategic behaviour of outlets after market entry or market exit.
10 For details, see Appendix.
profit. Outlets therefore respond by o↵ering a higher level of internal pluralism in order to increase advertising levels (see equation (11)) and advertising revenue per viewer.
This result is backed by empirical evidence from Berry and Waldfogel (2001) and George (2007) . Berry and Waldfogel (2001) show that consolidation in the US radio market, triggered by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, reduced entry but increased the number of radio formats broadcast. George (2007) demonstrates that increases in ownership concentration in US newspaper market lead firms to di↵erentiate products to a greater extent and cover a larger number of reporting topics. tion costs for consumers in the market 13 and quantify external pluralism as
or inserting equilibrium results as
External pluralism is then maximized at EP = 1 if each consumer finds its preferred content, i.e., if transportation costs are zero. This is both more likely to be true for a large number of outlets (n) and due to high levels of internal pluralism within each outlet (l i ). Di↵erentiation of equation (14) with respect to n gives @EP @n
After some manipulation 14 , using the previous equilibria, it can be shown
which is always true, because ✏ < 1 and @✏ @a > 0. Therefore, we can conclude: Proposition 2. External pluralism is lower in more concentrated markets.
We hence conclude that with advertising-financed media, a more concentrated market leads to a lower level of external pluralism. Although an individual outlet increases its variety of views o↵ered, the direct e↵ect of a reduced number of outlets dominates. This is an important result for media policy, for example, in broadcasting markets where advertising finance is common. Here, public policy should be concerned with excessively concen-13 One may also look at the aggregate distance between the indi↵erent consumer and the level of internal pluralism. This yields the same result, because aggregate transportation costs are a function of the aggregate distance.
14 For details, see Appendix.
trated markets, not only because of reduced economic competition, resulting in higher nuisance advertising, but also because of lower pluralism, resulting in the aforementioned negative social e↵ects.
Media policy deals with this concern by assessing and judging both market 
Pay media
Next, we extend the model and allow outlets to charge consumers directly, by charging a price for content of p i . In particular, in the traditional print media markets, there is a notable development towards subscription models as a response to the ongoing structural changes and the need for news outlets to develop new sources of revenue for their online content. News webpages such as BostonGlobe.com and NYTimes.com have erected paywalls that prevent consumers from accessing webpage content without a paid subscription. 15 The profit of outlet i is then given as
Di↵erentiation of equation (17) with respect to p gives the standard passthrough e↵ect of advertising revenue into the price (see, e.g., Peitz and Valletti, 2008) given as
The optimal level of internal pluralism is then given by solving the FOC of
which, given equation (18), gives
External pluralism is then given as
From equation (20), it follows direclty that internal pluralism increases with increasing market concentration. Otherwise, from equation (21), it follows that external pluralism is strictly decreasing with rising market concentration, because for l
2n (see Assumption 1) it must hold that 2t. It is thus straightforward to conclude:
Proposition 3. Internal pluralism is higher and external pluralism is lower in more concentrated markets.
Qualitatively, the comparative static e↵ects therefore correspond to those of advertising-financed media.
Comparison between advertising-financed and pay media
Let us next compare pluralism under advertising-financed and under pay media. A comparison of equation (20) with (8) together with (9) shows that for a given number of outlets, pluralism under pay media may be lower or higher than under advertising-financed media. This depends on the concavity of the revenue function, i.e., if
@R(a) @a
> , internal pluralism is higher under advertising-financed media. That is, it is higher, if the marginal benefit of an increase in advertising in terms of advertising revenues is larger than the marginal cost in terms of a loss in market share.
This holds for a given number of outlets. The long-run equilibrium number of outlets may, however, di↵er between advertising-financed and pay media.
Therefore, consider outlets additionally to incur some fixed entry cost of f .
In the long-run equilibrium, outlets enter as long as profits are non-negative, i.e., as long as ⇧ i (n) f 0. Then, the free-entry equilibrium number of outlets under advertising-financed media is given by
and under pay media is given by
Inserting the equilibrium number of outlets into equations (8) and (20) shows that advertising-financed outlets set a higher level of internal pluralism if
Proposition 4. Whenever
> , internal pluralism is higher under advertising-financed media than under pay media. This is especially true if the equilibrium level of advertising in the market is low, e.g., because of low transportation costs or in markets with many outlets (see equation (10)). The marginal revenue of advertising is then high and outlets have a strong incentive to compete for consumers by o↵ering more pluralism. With pay-media, such e↵ects are already internalized in the price, such that internal pluralism is not a↵ected by advertising income.
To demonstrate that such conditions can be fulfilled at equilibrium and that external pluralism may be also higher under advertising-financed me-dia, consider the following example. As in Choi (2006) , assume a per-viewer revenue of R(a) = a 1 and set parameters of V = 1, t = 1, = 0.1, = 5, and assume a fixed entry cost of f = 0.1. For such parameters, n + = 3 outlets enter in the long-run equilibrium under pay media, and external pluralism is EP + = 0.930. For advertising-financed media, the results depend additionally on the nuisance cost of advertising. Consider first a relatively low nuisance cost = 0.5. Then, three outlets enter in the long-run equilibrium 16 , and external pluralism under advertising-financed media is EP ⇤ = 0.965 and is thus higher than under pay media. For a higher nuisance cost of = 2, though, only two outlets enter, and external pluralism is EP ⇤ = 0.880, and thus lower than under pay media.
Monopoly
So far, we have assumed that each of the n outlets is owned by an inde- still the dominant source of current news. 17 They therefore play a disproportionate role in driving the overall news cycle. It is relevant whether a monopolistic or oligopolistic control of the media market is accountable for the public interest in pluralism. We consider the most extreme case of ownership concentration, a monopolist which is a single owner of the n outlets on the circle, and derive the monopolist's choice of internal and external pluralism. 16 We take account of integer constraints. Numerically, n ⇤ = 3.96 and n + = 3.0. Ignoring the integer constraint would not change the result qualitatively.
17 http://www.journalism.org/2010/01/11/how-news-happens/.
Advertising-financed media
We first focus on advertising-financed media and set p = 0. The monopolist maximizes the industry profit 18 of
Assume again that R(a) is concave in a and achieves its maximum atâ. For outlets in competition, we concluded that 
There is nothing to gain from costly pluralism in this case. Thus, the monopolist chooses internal pluralism of zero (it locates on a point on the circle). This, for example, holds for R(a) = (1 a)a, so thatâ = 1 2 and V tx â > 0 for su ciently large V .
In the more interesting case, it holds that a M <â. The monopolist's optimal choice of a then sets the utility of the indi↵erent consumer to zero. This, for example, holds for R(a) = a 1 . Thus, a M satisfies
The monopolist then sets a strictly positive level of internal pluralism, because the indi↵erent user is then left with higher utility and so the monopolist can increase advertising levels. This is profitable because @R(a) @a > 0 at the optimum.
Given a M , the monopolist sets internal pluralism such that
which gives
This is the same condition as (8). As with any outlet in competition, the monopolist balances the increase in per-user profit against the cost associated with providing internal pluralism. However, it sets a lower level of internal pluralism than outlets in competition. This follows from the concavity of R(a) and from a M > a ⇤ , so
@a | a=a ⇤ and thus, IP M < IP ⇤ . Comparative static e↵ects with respect to n are thus similar to those in Section 2:
Proposition 5. Internal pluralism is generally lower under monopoly ownership. An n-outlet monopolist chooses no internal pluralism if a M =â.
Otherwise, if a M <â, internal pluralism is higher and external pluralism is lower in more concentrated markets.
Since internal pluralism is lower under monopoly than under competition, external pluralism is also lower for a given number of firms. But, we also have to consider, whether in a long-run equilibrium, the same number of outlets would prevail in monopoly than in competition. This ultimately depends on entry and operation cost. One cannot simply conclude that the number of outlets is lower in a monopolistic market than in a competitive one, because multi-product firms internalize business stealing. An owner who acquires a competitor quite similar to his own would not be likely to continue operating both outlets in their previous form. Rather, she may decide either to close the competitor or to di↵erentiate both outlets by altering their content. We can easily construct an example in which the same number of outlets prevails in the long-run free-entry equilibrium in competition and at the n-outlet monopoly equilibrium. Assume again a per-viewer revenue of R(a) = a 1 and set parameters of V = 2, t = 1, = 0.1, = 0.5, and = 5. Assume a fixed entry cost for an individual outlet of f = 0.1. At the free-entry equilibrium, n = 3 outlets enter and each sets IP ⇤ i = 0.253. The n-outlet monopolist chooses a number of outlets to maximize its monopoly profit, which is also true at n = 3. As shown above, it sets a lower level of internal pluralism at IP M = 0.157.
Pay media
Assume now that the monopolist additionally charges user prices, so the industry profit becomes
We only consider a M <â, so the monopolist sets a strictly positive level of internal pluralism. Now, the monopolist has two instruments at hand to set the utility of the indi↵erent consumer to zero. Consider, it sets p such that the indi↵erent consumer is left with zero utility, i.e.,
Thus, when setting l, the monopolist simply balances the benefit stemming from higher utility for consumers (and thus, higher consumer prices) against the cost of providing pluralism. It thus faces exactly the same decision as an outlet in competition and thus, it sets the same level of pluralism as an outlet in competition, i.e. from @⇧ @l = t n l, it follows that
which is the same as in equation (20).
Proposition 6. Consider that a M <â. An n-outlet monopolist which both sets user prices and advertising levels sets the same level of pluralism as an outlet in competition for a given number of outlets.
The comparative static e↵ects with respect to n therefore follow section 2.2.
Remember that this result is again only true for a given number of outlets.
Extensions
This section discusses potential extensions of the model.
Doublehoming consumers
So far, we have assumed that consumers only patronize one outlet. Some consumers may additionally find it beneficial to consume from multiple outlets. This is especially true with online content where consumers can easily spread their attention across multiple outlets, at least, if outlets are without subscription. We restrict the analysis to such a case. This section briefly highlights the e↵ects of multihoming on pluralism. 19 Consider that consumers either decide to consume from one neighboring outlet or from both neighboring outlets, i.e., they decide to singlehome or to doublehome. A consumer located at position x between outlet i and outlet i+1 and singlehoming at outlet i, receives a surplus of U i = V t(x l i ) a i and a doublehoming consumer a surplus of
. 20 Then, the consumer indi↵erent between singlehoming at outlet i and doublehoming is located at
and similarly, the consumer indi↵erent between singlehoming at outlet i + 1 and doublehoming
Thus, x 1 consumers singlehome at outlet i and 1 n x 2 consumers singlehome at outlet i + 1. The rest of x 2 x 1 consumers doublehome at both outlets. This is depicted in Figure 1 for a market with four firms. The same logic holds for the other neighboring outlet all the way to outlet i, i.e., to outlet i 1.
In total, each outlet receives a number of consumers
Figure 1: Single-and doublehoming consumers.
Outlets maximize profit of ⇧ i = n i R(a i ) 2 l 2 i with respect to advertising and pluralism. 21
and the equilibrium level of pluralism (IP dh ) is given as
We have to ensure that the number of consumers at each outlet is reasonable and below 2/n at the equilibrium. At n i = 2/n, all consumers would doublehome and a single outlet cannot capture more than this number of consumers. That is, it has to hold that
We can now compare the equilibria to those derived in Section 2.1.
Lemma 2. The equilibrium advertising level with doublehoming consumers is lower than with singlehoming consumers.
A comparison of equation (9) with equation (35) shows that outlets set lower advertising with doublehoming consumers. This follows from condition (37).
Consider, to the contrary, that a dh > a ⇤ . Then, the left hand side of equation (35) would be smaller and the right hand side would be larger than the respective sides of equation (9), since R(a) is increasing and concave in the advertising level. Yet, this cannot be true. Thus, it has to hold that a dh  a ⇤ . But then, there is no straightforward answer as to whether internal pluralism is lower or higher with doublehoming consumers, because R(a dh ) < R(a ⇤ ) in equations (8) and (36). On the one hand, with doublehoming, outlets have an even larger incentive to o↵er internal pluralism in order to raise the number of consumers. On the other hand though, consumers are also more responsive to advertising (see equation (34)), causing a lower equilibrium level of advertising for the same reason. Whether internal pluralism is higher with doublehoming depends ultimately on the responsiveness of consumers to nuisance advertising. If consumers only respond moderately to advertising, internal pluralism is higher with doublehoming consumers.
Proposition 7. With doublehoming consumers, outlets might set lower or higher levels of internal pluralism than with singlehoming consumers.
The e↵ect on external pluralism depends additionally on the number of doublehoming consumers and on the long-run free-entry equilibrium number of firms. We leave such analysis for future research.
Welfare
This section briefly considers the implications of market concentration on total welfare. Let us restrict the analysis again to advertising-financed media. Welfare in a situation with n symmetric outlets consists of consumer rent CS = V a 2n
l txdx, benefits for advertisers R a 0 p(x)dx, outlet costs for providing variety 2 l 2 , and some additional fixed entry cost per outlet of f . Total welfare is thus given as
We now determine the comparative static e↵ect of media market concentra-tion on total welfare given oligopolistic behavior, that is, we employ e↵ects on second-best welfare. From the above comparative static results, it is clear that consumer rent is lower in more concentrated markets, because both advertising levels and total transportation cost (our measure of external pluralism) increase with rising market concentration. By contrast, advertisers benefit from market concentration, because
that is, the opportunity to display advertising is higher in more concentrated markets ( @a ⇤ @n < 0). Hence, market concentration has ambiguous e↵ects on welfare, consumers su↵er from higher levels of market concentration and advertisers benefit. Which of the two forces ultimately dominates depends on the parameters of the model. Consider again a per-viewer revenue of R(a) = a 1 and set parameters of V = 2, t = 2, = 0.1 and = 4.
Additionally, assume a fixed entry cost for an individual outlet of f = 0.1.
Whether total welfare increases or decreases in n depends on consumers' nuisance cost of advertising. Assume a nuisance cost of = 1.5. Welfare is then maximized for a number of three outlets. Otherwise, for a lower nuisance cost of = 1, welfare is maximized for n = 2. If advertising causes less nuisance for consumers, welfare is maximized for a lower number of outlets, because the resulting higher equilibrium level of advertising (see Lemma 1) has a lower impact on consumer welfare for lower values of , but benefits the advertising industry (see equation (39)).
Comparison with the free-entry equilibrium, where outlets enter as long as ⇧ i (n) 0, shows that welfare may or may not fall short, compared to the free market. For = 1.5, there are n = 3 outlets active in the market and thus, the long-run equilibrium number of outlets corresponds to the welfareoptimal number of outlets. Hence, any further reduction of the number of outlet leads to lower welfare. For = 1, three outlets are also active in the long-run equilibrium, but now there is excessive entry, so that the exit of one outlet would increase welfare. We can therefore conclude that further market concentration would harm consumers and benefits advertisers. It may therefore both increase or decrease welfare.
Proposition 8. Second-best welfare might be lower or higher in more con-centrated markets.
Conclusion
The present paper analyzes the connection between economic competition and pluralism in media markets. Competition policy often assumes that more concentrated media markets lead to a lower variety of views or opinions o↵ered in the markets. Such a perspective is based on the so-called external pluralism and assumes that outlets only o↵er one type of view, so that the market supply of views necessarily decreases with the number of outlets. The above analysis demonstrates, though, that higher market concentration leads outlets to increase what is referred to as internal pluralism, i.e., they increase the range of views o↵ered within an outlet. It turns out that a monopolist also may not necessarily o↵er less pluralism than in a competitive market.
Also, advertising-financed media does not necessarily o↵er less pluralism than pay media, which contradicts the old wisdom that pluralism under advertising-financed media is low. Our findings are consistent with those in the empirical literature, that ownership concentration in radio or newspaper produces greater programming variety.
There is scope for future work on this topic along several dimensions. For example, one could focus additionally on media bias. A higher level of pluralism may reduce bias, since diverse political opinions find their way into the news market. Moreover, one could eleborate more on multihoming and, for example, also allow advertisers to multihome. We showed that it is a priori unclear whether pluralism is larger or smaller than with singlehoming.
Outlets might set higher levels of internal pluralism to enlarge their number of consumers, but on the other hand, they set lower advertising levels for the same reason, which again reduces internal pluralism. One could also focus on the role of media intermediaries. Increasingly, traditional media industries are being supplanted by digital gatekeepers, such as Google or Facebook.
Although these are not traditional content creators, such companies are hitherto often the means by which consumers access digital media content.
A general debate about pluralism in the media must certainly include the role of these gatekeepers.
A Appendix
We derive the comparative static e↵ect of concentration on the equilibrium advertising level given by equation (11). From equation (10) 
Dividing both sides by @a ⇤ @n gives 1 = t n 2
(1 ✏)
Rearranging gives t n 2
and finally gives equation (11).
We next derive condition (16) and show that external pluralism is lower, the higher the market concentration. It holds that @EP @n > 0 if
The last term is always positive. We thus check whether the sum of the first two terms is positive as well. Given equations (8) and (9), the first two terms can also be written as 2n @R(a) @a @a ⇤ @n
Since at the optimum, 
This is true if
which is always true, because ✏ < 1 and @✏ @a > 0.
